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ABSTRACT: This article analyses the fact-finding practice of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to underscore some of the broad challenges 
faced by the Tribunal and to determine what lessons can be learned from its legacy for 
the future of complex international criminal trials. It fills a gap in the existing 
literature by taking a broad assessment of the lessons that can be learned from the 
ICTR’s fact-finding practice over the course of its lifetime, as the Tribunal adjudges 
upon its final case. It argues, inter alia, that it is difficult to derive consistent 
principles on the definition of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, the requirement of 
corroboration, and the weight to be given to different types of witness testimony. It 
also introduces the fundamental concepts of Bayesian probability, and argues that, 
given that international criminal judgments are inherently probabilistic in nature, the 
use of Bayes’ Theorem and Bayesian Networks might assist in the decision-making 
process, in enabling judges to question the strength of their own beliefs as to the truth 
of a matter. It concludes with some reflections on the function of international 
criminal tribunals in relation to the historical record of the conflicts upon which they 
adjudge.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
Judge Albie Sachs, formerly of the South African Constitutional Court, once noted 
that, ‘Every judgment I write is a lie.’1  He made this statement because of ‘the 
discrepancy between the calm and apparently ordered way in which it [the judgment] 
read, and the intense and troubled jumping backwards and forwards that had actually 
taken place when it was being written.’2 The internal uncertainty and introspection 
that Sachs described is something that every judge and decision-maker, in every 
jurisdiction, must face. For international criminal tribunals, not only are there unique 
challenges in the evidential context that inevitably give rise to even more doubts and 
uncertainties, but the stakes are raised by the expectations placed on their judgments. 
Tribunals are expected to set an accurate historical record of ‘what really happened’ 
in the conflicts and atrocities that they adjudge upon in order to prevent future 
denials.3 Additionally, they are expected to play a role in restoring peace in affected 
                                                        
*Lecturer in Law and Director of the Bangor Centre for International Law, Bangor University, UK. 
Email: y.mcdermott@bangor.ac.uk. I am grateful to the British Academy for funding this research, 
through a Quantitative Skills Acquisition Award.  
1 A. Sachs, The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 7. 
2 Id. 
3 See, inter alia, Address by Judge Dennis Byron, President of the ICTR before the United Nations 
General Assembly (13 October 2008) (‘Among the most basic and most important of the Tribunal’s 
regions, a peace that will inevitably be jeopardised by mistakes. Further, the 
consequences of their decisions for the right to liberty of individual defendants are 
greater than in the majority of domestic criminal trials, insofar as those who are 
convicted are likely to spend their sentences far from their homes and families.4  
This article examines the fact-finding practice of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) to underscore some of the broad challenges faced by the Tribunal 
and to determine what lessons can be learned from its legacy for the future of 
complex international criminal trials. The ICTR’s fact-finding practice has not been 
without criticism to date. In this symposium issue alone, authors note ‘serious 
inconsistencies’ in witnesses’ accounts;5  suggest that the ICTR has, on occasion, 
failed to fully highlight the bases for inferential judgments;6 and accuse one Trial 
Chamber of basing its judgment on witnesses who were either not credible or who 
testified to facts that fell outside the indictment.7 This symposium issue is not unique; 
some of these criticisms have arisen, and been discussed at length, elsewhere.8 By 
contrast, this piece takes a broader, more holistic, view of the ICTR’s achievements 
and the challenges it faced in fact-finding, and attempts to extract some principles 
from its practice on such issues as weighing evidence, drawing inferences, and 
defining the parameters of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of 
focussing on one judgment, or on a small sample of judgments, the piece draws on 
Trial and Appeal judgments from every contested trial (that is, those trials where a 
plea agreement did not form the basis of the judgment) from across the ICTR’s 
lifetime.  
This analysis is timely, because, at the time of writing, the ICTR had transferred all 
but its final appeal judgment to the residual Mechanism for the International Criminal 
Tribunals (MICT). The Tribunal finished hearing appeal submissions in that final 
case, involving six accused, in April 2015.9 This advanced stage in the Tribunal’s 
lifetime presents a good opportunity to undertake a retrospective analysis of its legacy 
in the realm of fact-finding, and to consider what lessons could be learned for other 
international criminal tribunals. Part II provides a general introduction to the fact-
finding landscape at the ICTR, including the. Parts III, IV and V examine a number of 
themes, namely: whether principles of evidence can be derived from judgments; the 
approaches taken by Trial Chambers to the assessment of evidence, and some of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
achievements has been the accumulation of an indisputable historical record’); R. A. Wilson, Writing 
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this volume. 
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9 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., (Transcript) ICTR-98-42-A (22 April 2015); the Trial Judgment 
in this case was issued in Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-42-A 
(24 June 2011).  
challenges that the Tribunal has faced in its fact-finding practice. Part VI concludes 
with some lessons that can be learned from the ICTR’s practice.  
 
II  FACT-FINDING AT THE ICTR: THE STANDARD OF PROOF AND THE 
EVIDENTIAL LANDSCAPE 
 
It is apposite to begin our discussion with a summary of relevant standards and 
concepts. As is well known, the standard of proof for judgments in the ICTR (and 
other international criminal tribunals) is that of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.10  The 
Appeals Chamber attempted to crystallize the meaning of this standard in Rutaganda: 
 
The reasonable doubt standard in criminal law cannot consist in imaginary or frivolous doubt 
based on empathy or prejudice. It must be based on logic and common sense, and have a 
rational link to the evidence, lack of evidence or inconsistencies in the evidence.11 
 
Aside from this dictum, the ICTR has tended not to go into any further detail on the 
precise meaning of a ‘reasonable doubt’, and that is perhaps wise, given its difficulty 
to pin down with a definition and the confusion it can sometimes caused, as illustrated 
in domestic contexts.12 Other international criminal tribunals have, however, provided 
some further interpretations; for the United States Military Tribunal in Pohl, it 
equated to ‘moral certainty’, 13  while the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Delalić drew on jurisprudence from the common law in 
its elucidation of the standard, noting Lord Denning’s explanation that: 
 
It need not reach certainty but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to 
protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the 
evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which 
can be dismissed with the sentence, ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’, the 
case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.14  
 
In Ngirabatware, the Appeals Chamber of the MICT confirmed an approach taken by 
the ICTY that may be seen as ‘the exclusion of every reasonable alternative 
explanation [other than that of guilt]’.15 Under this test, it does not mean that no doubt 
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11 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-A (26 May 2003), para. 488. 
12 In England and Wales, for example, judges no longer use the direction "You must be satisfied of 
guilt beyond all reasonable doubt." Instead, they direct the jury that ‘before they can return a verdict of 
guilty, they must be sure that the defendant is guilty’: R v. Majid [2009] EWCA Crim 256, para. 11.  
13 United States v. Pohl et al., (1948) 5 TWC 1, 965 (United States Military Tribunal). The concept of 
‘moral certainty’ has some pedigree in the common law: B.J. Shapiro, ‘“To a Moral Certainty”: 
Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850’ (1986) 38 Hastings Law Journal 153. 
The notion of ‘certainty’ occasionally arises with regard to individual facts before the ICTR: see, e.g. 
Kalimanzira v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-05-88-A (20 October 2010), para. 77 (‘it is impossible to 
determine with any reasonable certainty whether any killings in fact occurred following the meeting 
and, if so, the degree to which they were related to the ceremony’) and Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, 
(Judgment) ICTR-95-1A-T (7 June 2001), para. 1014.  
14 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998), para. 600, citing Miller v. 
Minister of Pensions [1947] 1 All ER 372, 373-4. 
15  Ngirabatware v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) MICT-12-29-A (18 December 2014), para. 20, citing 
Prosecutor v. Mrkšić and Šljivančanin, (Judgment) IT-95-13/1-A (5 May 2009), para. 220. For an 
extensive discussion of the ‘alternative hypothesis’ approach, see M. Klamberg, ‘The Alternative 
Hypothesis Approach, Robustness and International Criminal Justice: A Plea for a “Combined 
Approach” to Evaluation of Evidence’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 535; S. De 
exists as to the guilt of the accused, but when a reading of the evidence suggests a 
rational possibility of innocence, he or she must be acquitted. 16  Before the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), Judge Van den Wyngaert clearly followed this 
approach when she stated that it was her ‘firm belief that another reasonable reading 
of the evidence is possible in this case.’17  
Despite these attempts to clarify the extent of the standard of proof, it remains 
controversial in international criminal trials, as seen by recent practice before the ICC. 
In Ngudjolo, the Prosecutor accused the Trial Chamber of basing its acquittal on an 
alternative reading of the evidence that was not based on ‘evidence, logic, reason or 
common sense.’ 18  The Appeals Chamber disagreed and upheld the acquittal. 19  It 
should be noted that the Trial Chamber held that it could not entirely rule out the 
Prosecutor’s hypothesis, but nevertheless, it was unable to reach a conclusion of guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt.20  
We can potentially extrapolate two steps in meeting the standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt from the above discussion. First, is there a reasonable alternative 
hypothesis to the hypothesis presented by the prosecution, or any doubt in the mind of 
the judge on the possible guilt of the accused? Second, what is the basis for that doubt 
or alternative explanation? If it is based on the evidence, a lack of evidence, or 
inconsistencies in the evidential record, then the accused must be acquitted. In other 
words, neither positive evidence that contradicts the Prosecutor’s story nor an 
alternative reading of the evidence that is more likely than the prosecutorial 
hypothesis is required; the beyond reasonable doubt standard will not be met where 
the Trial Chamber feels that the evidence cannot fully sustain a conviction, giving rise 
to doubt, or that an alternative reasonable reading of the evidence is possible. Where 
the Chamber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt, it does 
not need to be convinced of his or her innocence in order to acquit.21 
Where an appeal is made on an issue of fact, the standard is whether the Trial 
Chamber’s conclusion on that issue is one that ‘no reasonable trier of fact’ could have 
reached,22 and whether that error of fact occasioned a miscarriage of justice.23 Given 
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16 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment, ibid., para. 220. This notion is also reflected in the 
writings of J.H. Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof (2nd edn, Chicago: Little, Brown & Co., 
1931) 28, who stated that where ‘a single other inference remains open, complete proof fails: the 
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17 Situation in the DRC: Prosecutor v. Katanga, (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/07-3436 (7 March 2014), 
Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, para. 134. 
18  Situation in the DRC: Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment 
on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber II entitled “Judgment pursuant to 
article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/04-02/12-271 (27 February 2015), para. 42. 
19  By majority, Judges Tarfusser and Trendafilova dissenting. Their dissent discussed in detail 
elsewhere: Y. McDermott. ‘Inferential Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal Trials’ (2015) 13 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 507. 
20 Situation in the DRC: Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) 
ICC-01/04-02/12-3 (12 April 2013), para. 456. 
21  This point is made, in the context of appeals on questions of fact, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
(Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001), para. 178. 
22 Amongst many others, see: Zigiranyirazo v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-01-73-A (16 November 
2009), para. 10. See also Karera v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-01-74-A (2 February 2009), para. 9; 
Kamuhanda v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-99-54A-A (19 September 2005), para. 7; Prosecutor v. 
this standard of proof, an appellant cannot merely restate unsuccessful arguments 
from trial again at appeal. In assessing whether ‘no reasonable trier of fact’ could 
have reached the same conclusions as the Trial Chamber, a large degree of deference 
is shown to on its factual findings, and this is evidenced by a number of Appeals 
Chamber judgments. In Hategikimana, for example, the Appeals Chamber 
acknowledged that the Trial Chamber had not discussed his knowledge of his 
subordinates’ criminal conduct, but nevertheless concluded that no error was ‘clearly 
apparent’ from that fact; the Appeals Chamber found that this aspect could be implied 
from some of the Trial Chamber’s other factual findings. 24  As regards the 
‘miscarriage of justice’ aspect for alleging errors of fact, the accused must merely 
show that the factual errors give rise to reasonable doubt, whereas the Prosecutor has 
to prove that ‘all reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt has been eliminated’.25 
As Anderson and Twining have noted, cases tend to turn on just one ‘jugular’ – a key 
fact that is fundamental to the ultimate conclusion of the Trial Chamber,26 and that is 
certainly no different before the ICTR. Examples of such jugular facts include: 
whether the accused’s alibi defence is reasonably possibly true,27 or whether those 
who committed the criminal acts were the accused’s subordinates.28  
A number of factors differentiate the evidential landscape at the ICTR from other 
international criminal tribunals. For a start, alibi defences appear to be much more 
common before the ICTR. Alibis were introduced in over half of all ICTR contested 
cases; by contrast, fewer than ten defendants (out of 110) tried by the ICTY raised 
alibi defences.29  
The second notable feature of the ICTR compared to its sister tribunal is the 
preponderance of oral testimony, with less reliance on documentary evidence and 
written witness statements in lieu of oral testimony.30 This means that a great deal of 
the Trial Chamber’s effort is expended on assessing the credibility of witnesses for 
both parties. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber set down the conditions for challenging 
the credibility of witnesses.31 First, such challenges must be particularized to the 
individual witness – it is not sufficient to point to the fact that other witnesses for the 
party have been found to be lying.32 Second, the foundations for the challenge to the 
witness’s credibility must be put to the witness during cross-examination, and the 
witness must be given the opportunity to respond to that allegation; the Trial Chamber 
described this as ‘simply a matter of justice and fairness to victims and witnesses, 
principles recognised in all legal systems throughout the world.’33  
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32 Id. 
33 Id.  
The third feature that distinguishes ICTR practice from that of its contemporaries is 
that alleged errors of fact appear to be much more common in appeal proceedings at 
the ICTR than before other tribunals, where the majority of appeals centre around 
errors of law. Indeed, before the ICTY, it is not uncommon for an alleged error of fact 
to be reframed as an error of law, perhaps owing to the perception that it is easier to 
successfully allege an error of law on appeal than it is to succeed on an alleged error 
of fact. For example, in Strugar, the Prosecutor’s clear objection was that the Trial 
Chamber should have found that the accused ‘knew or had reason to know’ that his 
subordinates were about to commit an offence prior to the attack in question.34 This 
would appear, on its face, to be a clear error of fact, but the appeal was framed in such 
a way that the prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber misapprehended the mens 
rea element under Article 7(3), an error of law.35 The prosecution was successful in 
arguing this ground of appeal.36 By contrast, ‘straightforward’ appeals on the basis of 
errors of fact remain common before the ICTR,37 albeit also with infrequent success.38 
It should be recalled that the standard of appeal is, by its very nature, higher for 
alleged errors of appeal, given that the Appeals Chamber’s function is not to 
determine whether the Trial Chamber’s findings are ‘correct’ (this is the standard for 
alleged errors of law), 39  but rather whether they are ‘reasonable’. 40  To this end, 
deference tends to be shown to the Trial Chamber’s factual findings.41 
Having established the general evidential landscape before the ICTR, and the 
principles that apply, we will now turn to the question of whether principles of proof 
can be extrapolated from the ICTR’s practice to date.  
 
III DERIVING PRINCIPLES OF PROOF FROM ICTR JUDGMENTS 
 
Given that the ICTR has been in operation for over 15 years, one might have thought 
that relatively clear principles might have emerged on questions of proof, such as the 
circumstances in which corroboration is required; the weight to be given to different 
types of evidence, and whether oral testimony is to be preferred to written witness 
statements, and other such considerations in decision-making. Yet, no clear consistent 
practice on these issues has emerged within the ICTR, let alone across it and other 
international criminal tribunals. Indeed, as part of the International Criminal 
Procedure: Rules and Principles volume, four authors attempted to extract those 
principles (taken to mean the essential pillars to any international criminal justice 
                                                        
34 Prosecutor v. Strugar (Judgment) IT-01-42-A (17 July 2008), para. 284.  
35 Ibid., paras. 285-290. 
36 Ibid., para. 310.  
37 To give an example, see the recent Appeals Chamber judgment in Karemera and Ngirumpatse v. 
Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-98-44-A (29 September 2014) 
38 Ibid.: the appeals on alleged errors of fact were rejected in paras. 193; 204; 206; 207; 216; 229; 243; 
258 (despite the fact that the Trial Chamber failed to cite any evidence to support its conclusion); 263; 
281; 333; 439; 464; 465; 499; 508-510; 559; 578; and 579. They were successful at paras. 285-286 and 
292-293, but these findings had no bearing on the accused’s conviction. 
39 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, (Judgment) IT-97-25-A (17 September 2003), para. 10.  
40 Karemera and Ngirumpatse v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-98-44-A (29 September 2014), para. 
52: ‘two reasonable triers of facts may reach different but equally reasonable conclusions’; Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, (Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999), Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 30 
(‘Not every reasonable exercise of judgment is right, and not every mistaken exercise of judgment is 
unreasonable.’) 
41 See e.g. Hategekimana Appeal Judgment (n 24), where all alleged errors of fact were dismissed, 
even in light of evidential insufficiencies or gaps in the Trial Chamber’s reasoning.  
system) 42  and rules (‘the prevalent procedural solutions within the international 
criminal justice system’)43 that could be extrapolated on the burden and standard of 
proof before international criminal tribunals. They concluded that no rules could be 
derived from their law and practice, and the only principles identified were: that the 
accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence; that the burden of proof rests 
with the prosecutor; that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and the 
in dubio pro reo (if in doubt, the interpretation that favours the accused must be 
taken) principle.44 This section will attempt to decipher what the ICTR’s general 
position was in relation to issues of fact-finding and proof. 
As regards the types of evidence that can be used in the ICTR’s deliberations, it will 
be recalled that Rule 89(C) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence incorporates 
something of a ‘free proof’ approach, insofar as it allows a Chamber to admit any 
relevant evidence that it deems to have probative value. 45  Under Rule 90(A), 
witnesses ‘shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers unless a Chamber has 
ordered that the witness be heard by means of a deposition’ under Rule 71. Rule 92bis 
allows for witness statements to be admitted in lieu of oral testimony, where they do 
not go towards proving the acts and conduct of the accused.  
The preference for orality was confirmed in Akayesu.46 In Bagilishema, the accused 
was acquitted when the Trial Chamber could not accept the testimony of prosecution 
witnesses, in light of serious inconsistencies between their in-court testimony and 
prior statements.47 On appeal, the Prosecutor alleged that the Trial Chamber had erred 
by placing more weight on written statements than on in-court live testimony.48 The 
Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s approach, which had acknowledged 
that some inconsistencies may be explained by factors such as ‘the lapse of time, the 
language used, the questions put to the witness and the accuracy of interpretation and 
transcription, and the impact of trauma on the witnesses’, but that where such 
inconsistencies could not be explained, this might call the reliability of the witnesses’ 
accounts into question.49 
There has been some debate as to the relevance of reliability in admissibility 
decisions. The Trial Chamber in Musema found that ‘reliability is the invisible golden 
thread which runs through all the components of admissibility’, and that reliability 
forms the basis of decisions on the relevance and probative value of the evidence, 
under Rule 89(C).50 Judge Shahabuddeen disagreed, finding that reliability comes 
after the evidence (presuming it is relevant and with probative value) has been 
admitted – if it is later found not to be credible, it will simply have no weight and be 
eliminated from the Chamber’s deliberations.51   
                                                        
42 G. Sluiter et al., ‘Introduction’, in G. Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Rules 
and Principles (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 11.  
43 Id. 
44 F. Gaynor et al., ‘Law of Evidence’, in G. Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: 
Rules and Principles (n 42), 1148.  
45 Rule 89(C), ICTR RPE. 
46 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 31), para. 137; Akayesu Appeal Judgment (n 21), paras. 131-137.  
47 Bagilishema Trial Judgment (n 13). 
48 Bagilishema Appeal Judgment (n 25). 
49 Bagilishema Trial Judgment (n 13), para. 24; Bagilishema Appeal Judgment (n 25), para. 107. 
50 Musema Judgment (n 27), paras. 37-38. 
51 Musema Judgment (n 27), Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 9.  
There is no rule, as such, on corroboration before the ICTR – the unus testis, nullus 
testis rule does not apply,52 and it is for the Trial Chamber to assess the credibility of 
evidence or testimony of each piece of evidence, on the basis of the evidential record 
as a whole.53 As the Trial Chamber in Musema noted: 
 
The Chamber may freely assess the relevance and credibility of all evidence presented to it. 
The Chamber notes that this freedom to assess evidence extends even to those testimonies 
which are corroborated: the corroboration of testimonies, even by many witnesses, does not 
establish absolutely the credibility of those testimonies.54 
 
That being said, a lack of corroboration can clearly be crucial to the assessment of 
evidence. In Bizimungu et al., for example, the Trial Chamber held it could conclude 
that the accused Mugiraneza was present at a rally, solely on the basis of 
uncorroborated prosecution testimony. 55  In Kayishema, the Trial Chamber 
emphasised the importance of corroboration in potentially removing doubts about a 
testimony.56 We might extract from this a principle from the ICTR’s practice, namely 
that if one piece of evidence is entirely reliable, there is no need for corroboration 
(this is what Schum referred to as ‘corroborative redundancy’), whereas where none 
of the sources can be said to be completely reliable, than there is a need for 
corroboration.57 
Equally, no clear rule on hearsay can be adduced, aside from the fact that the Trial 
Chamber can use such evidence in its final deliberations. Chambers have emphasised 
that hearsay evidence should be approached with caution.58 However, it appears that 
hearsay evidence from expert witnesses will bear weight, as evidenced by the value 
attached to hearsay witnesses on historical facts.59 
 
IV APPROACHES TO THE ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE 
 
We have discussed above the ICTR’s approach to such issues as hearsay evidence, 
admissibility, corroboration and reliability. However, quite frequently we can observe 
that the narrative put forward by one of the parties is confirmed or dismissed on the 
grounds of what Bentham called ‘infirmative suppositions’ – these are elements that 
make an evidentiary fact either improbable or impossible. 60  With infirmative 
                                                        
52 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 31), paras. 132-136; Prosecutor v. Seromba, (Judgment) ICTR-2001-66-
A (12 March 2008), paras. 91-92.  
53 Ntabakuze v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-98-41A-A (8 May 2012), para. 150 (finding that the 
Trial Chamber’s ‘holistic approach to the evidence’ was not unreasonable.); see also Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Judgment (Reasons)) ICTR-95-1-A (1 June 2001), para. 165; Prosecutor 
v. Furundžija, (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000), para. 69; Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 
(Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001), para. 481; Bagilishema Appeal Judgment (n 25), para. 88. 
54 Musema Judgment (n 27), para. 46. 
55 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., (Judgment) ICTR-99-50-T (30 September 2011), para. 229 
56 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999), para. 80. 
57 D. Schum, ‘Evidence and Inferences about Past Events: An Overview of Six Case Studies’, in W. 
Twining and I. Hampsher-Monk (eds), Evidence and Inference in History and Law: Interdisciplinary 
Dialogues (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003) 9, 25. 
58 Akayesu Trial Judgment (n 31), para. 136; Bagosora Trial Judgment (n 28), para. 25. 
59 See e.g. Bagosora and Nsengiyumva v. Prosecutor, (Judgment) ICTR-98-41-A (14 December 2011), 
paras. 220-228 (on historical expert witness Dr. Alison Desforges).  
60 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (London: Hunt and Clarke, 1827), Vol. III, Chapter XV, 
‘Probative Force’, 221. See further, G. Postema, ‘Fact, fictions, and Law: Bentham and the 
Foundations of Evidence in W. Twining (ed.), Facts in Law: Proceedings of the 1982 Conference of 
the Association for Legal and Social Philosophy 37, 58-59. 
suppositions, the past experience of the decision-maker comes into play in deciding 
whether the evidence makes sense in that light. 61  An example of an infirmative 
supposition appears in Bizimungu et al., where the Trial Chamber concluded that it 
was reasonable that the accused would go to the home of his in-laws, where his 
family were, ‘rather than leaving his family and attending an evening meeting 
approximately 45 minutes away.’62 Equally, looking at a time when the accused had 
not yet assumed his formal duties, the Chamber felt it reasonable that he would have 
remained with his family at that time.63 Similarly, in Nzabonimana, the Trial Chamber 
considered it ‘unlikely that a group of Tutsis fleeing a violent attack at their place of 
refuge … would choose to disguise themselves as Hutus and join a group of people 
gathered in a trading centre for a brief time before continuing on their journey.’64 Yet, 
how can those of us fortunate enough to have never been in such a tragic situation 
possibly imagine what constitutes reasonable behaviour when fleeing a violent 
genocidal attack? A third example can be found in Judge Gunawardana’s separate 
opinion in Bagilishema, where he suggested that it was unrealistic, as the prosecution 
asserted, to expect that in the course of a single short and impromptu meeting, the 
accused ‘changed from having a bone fide intent to protect the Tutsis, to a genocidal 
intent to exterminate the Tutsi population on ethnic grounds’.65 These generalisations 
are not always expressly articulated (and, as Paul Roberts has insightfully pointed out 
on the issue of ‘Mr. Seferovic’s pigeons’ in Tadić,66 not always strictly necessary, on 
the basis of the evidence), but are crucial for credibility assessments and proof of facts 
in international criminal trials.  
A key issue in assessing the strength of an appeal on alleged errors of fact is the 
general position taken by Trial Chambers, which states at the outset that even where 
particular pieces of evidence, problems, or inconsistencies with the evidence, were 
not expressly referred to in the judgment, that does not mean that they were not 
considered.67 As the Musema Appeals Judgment highlights, this makes it difficult for 
the appellant, who must not only prove that the finding made by the Trial Chamber is 
incorrect; in order to show that the finding is one that no reasonable trier of fact could 
have reached, they must also show that ‘the Trial Chamber indeed disregarded some 
item of evidence’,68 and this cannot be proven by the bare fact that the Chamber did 
not refer to that piece of evidence. 
As Oliver Windridge 69  has noted, the standard of assessment for circumstantial 
evidence is that, if the accused is to be convicted, his or her guilt must be the ‘only 
reasonable inference’ that can be drawn from that evidence.70 This raises the question 
of whether the accused needs to provide an alternative, reasonable, inference to 
counter that presented by the prosecution in its case. Of course, in light of the 
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presumption of innocence and the prosecutorial burden of proof, we must answer this 
question in the negative. 71  It is not necessary to present a specific alternative 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence in order to show that guilt 
was not the only reasonable inference. In Bagosora and Nsengiyumva, for example, 
Nsengiyumva reminded the Appeals Chamber that there was no direct evidence 
showing that he had ordered the killings that took place in Gisenyi town on 7 April, 
and submitted that the evidence was ‘open to multiple reasonable inferences 
consistent with his innocence.’72 The Trial Chamber had held that the only reasonable 
inference was that, as the highest military authority in the prefecture, he must have 
ordered the killings.73 The Appeals Chamber upheld Nsengiyumva’s appeal, finding 
that it was not the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence. 
Equally, although the standard of proof clearly places no positive burden on the 
accused, even when he or she invokes a defence of alibi (all that is required is for that 
alibi evidence to create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judges), in practice, it 
would seem from the language of some judgments that the defence case is 
strengthened where it can persuade the court of an alternative narrative. Take this 
example from Kanyarukiga; the Trial Chamber noted that it ‘[did] not believe the 
accounts of any of the Defence witnesses … and believes their accounts … support 
the Chamber’s view that the alibi is a fabricated story, contrived in favour of the 
accused.’74  
 
V CHALLENGES TO FACT-FINDING BEFORE THE ICTR 
 
The first clear challenge to fact-finding before the ICTR is the volume of the 
evidential record. In order to establish the truth of a matter, the Chamber needs all of 
the relevant evidence, and if it cannot access all of the evidence in this way, its factual 
findings will be defeasible. Given the constraints of time, resources, and witness co-
operation before the ICTR, it is simply impossible for the Tribunal (and other 
international criminal tribunals in the future) to access all of the relevant evidence 
and, in turn, achieve full certainty over its conclusions. This is not unique to ICTR 
proceedings; Anderson, Schum and Twining have noted five key challenges in 
achieving certainty in legal reasoning in any legal context, namely that evidence is 
always: incomplete, inconclusive, ambiguous (meaning that we cannot decide what 
the information conveys – an example before the ICTR might include a certain term 
used by an accused, where it will fall to the Chamber to determine whether that 
phrase evidences genocidal intent), dissonant (meaning that some evidence will 
directly contradict other evidence on the record) and lacking in perfect credibility.75 
This means that reasoning before international criminal trials is always necessarily 
probabilistic, and that perhaps judgments are not necessarily the best source for an 
‘historical record’ on what happened in the conflict, a point I shall return to in a 
moment. 
Given that fact-finding before international criminal tribunals is always going to be an 
exercise in probability, judges might do well to consider some basic principles of 
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probability in their deliberations. The first decision that judges will have to decide is 
what percentage of probability we put on the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard. If 
this is set at 90%,76 it is accepted that one in ten of those found guilty are actually 
innocent. If the probability ratio is set at 95%,77 we accept that one in 20 innocents 
will be convicted. The level of probability required to satisfy the ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ standard is a legal decision, to be made by judges, but they should be aware of 
the consequent risk of wrongful conviction when setting that standard. By putting a 
mathematical figure on the level of certainty required, this exercise forces the 
decision-maker to interrogate his or her own intuition.78 From there, the decision 
maker can potentially make use of such probability tools as Bayes’ Theorem, which is 
a mathematical formula that can be used to update the probability of a hypothesis in 
the light of new evidence. 79  Bayes’ Theorem gives the correct logical method 
measuring how a subjective belief of probability should change in light of evidence 
presented.80 In order to apply Bayes’ Theorem, one begins with the prior odds (the 
likelihood of a hypothesis – in the case of a criminal trial, guilt or innocence) – it will 
be for the decision-maker to attach subjective probabilities to the likelihood of 
innocence or guilt at the outset. The prior odds of guilt should be set to sufficiently 
take into account the presumption of innocence; Friedman suggests that it should be 
set at 1:X, ‘where X is a large number, perhaps on the order of the entire population 
of people who might have committed the crime’.81 Bayes’ Theorem combines these 
prior odds with the likelihood ratio for the evidence (that is, ‘the likelihood of the 
evidence if the prosecution’s proposition is true’ and ‘the likelihood of the evidence if 
the defence proposition is true’)82 to calculate the ‘posterior odds’, or the likelihood of 
innocence/guilt, in light of the evidence. The process can be repeated to take into 
account each subsequent piece of evidence and adjust the posterior odds accordingly. 
By today, the inevitable complexity of Bayesian calculations is alleviated by the 
existence of computer software (including some excellent free programmes, like 
GeNIe) 83  to create so-called ‘Bayes nets’, or graphical representations of the 
probabilistic relationships between variables and their relationships. 
The basic version of Bayesian probability outlined above, especially the subjective 
setting of prior odds may seem rather unscientific to the outsider, but it is, after all, 
little more than a quantification of the decision-maker’s mind. A judge might 
reasonably remark to a clerk or colleague on the bench that she was confident of the 
accused’s innocence before a certain piece of evidence was introduced, but having 
seen that piece of evidence, she was now more convinced that he might reasonably be 
guilty. Bayes’ Theorem challenges the judge to quantify her intensity of belief at both 
stages, before and after the evidence is taken into account.  
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This brings us back to the value of having as complete an evidential record as 
possible. In Keynesian terms, the volume of evidence ensures the ‘weight’ of an 
argument and the introduction of new evidence ‘will sometimes decrease the 
probability of an argument, but it will always increase its weight’.84 The use of the 
term ‘weight’ in this context is confusing, because in international criminal law, 
‘weight’ refers to a qualitative assessment on the value to be attached to the evidence. 
Therefore, an alternative term, such as ‘robustness’85 or ‘quantum’86 of evidence is to 
be preferred. Where, for example, four defence witnesses testify to a particular matter, 
the probative value of their combined evidence may be the same as that for two 
witnesses, but the Keynesian weight (or robustness or quantum of evidence) for that 
argument will be increased. 
What, then, is the value to be placed on the number of witnesses or the volume of 
evidence? The straightforward answer is none whatsoever – the testimony of one saint 
would be worth more than that of fifty sinners, and we should encourage against any 
‘head-counting’ approach to proof.87 Nevertheless, in certain cases, the robustness of 
the defence case highlighted the weaknesses in the prosecution’s evidence, and 
apparently created doubt in the minds of the judges. In Bizimungu et al., for example, 
the prosecution presented just one hearsay witness to attest to the fact that the accused 
Bizimungu went to Zaire (as it then was) to purchase weapons; this evidence was 
refuted by the source of that hearsay, and seven defence witnesses testified to the 
contrary.88 It is unsurprising that the Chamber could not accept the prosecution’s 
narrative in these circumstances. 
Before turning to issues on the quality of evidence, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss 
the issues surrounding the expectation that the ICTR, and its contemporaries, will 
play a role in setting an accurate historical record. While this is a function frequently 
ascribed to the tribunals,89 it is notable that only one judgment in the ICTR’s entire 
record actually mentions this apparent goal, and probably not in the broad context that 
one might expecy. In Kalimanzira, the Trial Chamber noted that the prosecution and 
defence evidence, when taken together, presented a ‘broader historical record’ as to 
what happened on Kabuye Hill on 23 April 1994.90 Aside from that, the President of 
the ICTR noted, in a speech made to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the 1994 
genocide that the Tribunal had: 
 
preserved for posterity a record of the atrocities committed, established beyond any doubt or 
possible denial – in judgment after judgment – that those atrocities constituted a genocide, and 
brought to justice many of those accused of planning and executing one of the most brutal and 
efficient killing campaigns the world has ever witnessed.91 
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We might ask whether this expectation that international criminal tribunals can and 
will set an accurate historical record asks too much of the ICTR and its 
contemporaries. Perhaps a distinction can be drawn between the ‘historical narrative’ 
that the ICTR has undoubtedly drawn by establishing that a genocide occurred in 
Rwanda, that this genocide was planned at the highest levels and implemented 
through, inter alia, a campaign of desensitization towards and dehumanization of the 
victims of that genocidal campaign. Aside from that broader historical narrative, 
however, it is unrealistic to expect the ICTR to set an historical record – that is, an 
irrefutable detailed account of what really happened. Take, for example, the findings 
in Bagosora et al. on the murder of several hundred Tutsis who had sought refuge at 
the Central African Adventist University in Mudende. 92  The Trial Chamber was 
convinced of the Rwandan army’s involvement in this massacre. 93  On appeal, 
however, the Appeals Chamber noted that the witnesses had identified the accused’s 
subordinates from the military based on their uniforms, but that there were other 
groups who also wore similar uniforms, and thus the involvement of the ‘regular’ 
army, while likely, was not the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn, and 
therefore could not form the basis of a conviction.94 While this conclusion is no doubt 
in conformity with the ICTR’s relevant rules and standards of proof, it could not be 
said to have set an historical record, to the extent that the families of those victims 
cannot say that the ICTR irrefutably established who was responsible for their loss. 
This highlights the Tribunal’s inability to meet the expectation of setting an historical 
record – it not only has insufficient evidence to hand to draw a full historical record 
on exactly what happened; it is limited by the scope of its own mandate, which is 
solely concerned with establishing the guilt or innocence of individual defendants 
pursuant to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, from doing so. 
The quality of the evidence is also problematic before the ICTR. Problems that have 
arisen in practice include: allegations of witness interference;95 witnesses’ uncertainty 
about the contents of their testimony;96 difficulties with translation;97  the inherent 
fallibility of eyewitness testimony, which the ICTR relies a great deal upon, and 
cultural barriers, including the inexperience of witnesses with maps, and different 
ways of expressing time, distance and locations.98  One area of practice that has 
improved the ICTR’s ability to assess witnesses’ accounts has been the increased use 
of site visits. For example, in Zigiranyirazo, a site visit enabled the Chamber to assess 
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whether it was possible for the witness to identify the accused from their standpoint.99 
This is perhaps more acute for the ICTR, given Rwanda’s unique geography; because 
of its hilly terrain, it is actually possible to get a good view of neighbouring hills, 
which may seem far apart on a map.100  In Kanyarukiga, the Trial Chamber’s site visit 
confirmed to it ‘that the route described by the Defence witnesses was too long and 
precarious to be taken at all on 16 April 1994.’101 
 
VI CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
This article highlighted some of the issues surrounding proof in international criminal 
trials, with a particular focus on the ICTR. It attempted to extract a definition of 
‘reasonable doubt’ for the purposes of the standard of proof from the ICTR’s practice 
to date, and discussed the standard of appeal for questions of fact. We examined the 
three distinct features of the evidential landscape before the ICTR, as compared to its 
contemporaries, namely: the importance of live witness testimony, the preponderance 
of alibi defences, and the centrality of alleged errors of fact to appeals.  
One key message that can be extracted from this overview of ICTR practice is the 
remarkable difficulty in deriving concrete principles of proof from the Tribunal’s 
jurisprudence. Individual Trial Chambers differ in their approach to such issues as the 
requirements of corroboration; the weight to be attached to hearsay testimony, and the 
value of oral testimony over written statements.  
As regards the assessment of evidence, we recalled that evidence (in all contexts, not 
just the ICTR) is likely to be both incomplete and inconclusive, with substantial 
contradiction and ambiguity between witnesses’ accounts.102 By consequence, then, 
reasoning on facts in (international) criminal trials is necessarily probabilistic in 
nature. A very brief introduction to Bayesian probability suggested a way in which 
judges in the future might test their confidence in hypotheses, given the evidence. 
Aside from the well-documented challenges on the quality of evidence before the 
ICTR and other international criminal tribunals, and the cultural, linguistic, and other 
barriers that hamper full assessment of evidence and witness testimony, we noted 
some issues pertaining to the quantity of evidence. For one thing, the volume of 
evidence is insufficient to establish the historical truth, insofar as all relevant evidence 
would be needed for such an assessment, and the evidential record before the ICTR is 
necessarily limited. Moreover, perhaps, the (international) criminal trial is ill suited to 
serving as an historical inquiry, given the limitations of its mandate, and so perhaps 
that expectation needs to be managed. The second major issue surrounding the 
quantity of evidence was the impact of ‘robustness’ (or ‘Keynesian weight’) on the 
findings of the Tribunal.   
What lessons, then, can we learn from the practice of the ICTR for the future of trials 
before other international criminal tribunals? For a start, there still remains 
uncertainty as to the meaning of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard, and this is 
apparent from recent practice before the ICC. Second, generally accepted rules on the 
weighing of evidence remain to be developed, with Chambers preferring to assess 
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weight on a case-by-case basis. Third, the nature of reasoning in international 
criminal trials is inherently probabilistic, and judges and practitioners might benefit 
from some basic training in probability methods, including but not limited to 
Bayesian networks. More generally, there is an increasing impetus towards 
formalising proof in international criminal law, with an emphasis on Wigmorean 
analysis,103 inference to the best explanation,104 and probability theory.105 It is hoped 
that this exciting new direction for evidence scholarship will continue to help 
strengthen reasoning and proof in international criminal trials. 
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